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The Singapore Declaration And The Biden Administration¡¯s Policy Review
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Scott Snyder
Kim Jong-un gives an address at the inauguration ceremony of a hospital in Pyongyang, North Korea on March 27, 2020. API/GAMMA-RAPHO VIA GETTY IMAGES
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The Biden administration is in the midst of a North Korea policy review that will shape prospects for diplomacy and the relative priority of North Korea on the new president¡¯s to-do list. Perhaps the earliest and most significant issue the Biden administration faces as part of that review is whether to use the Singapore Declaration as a foundation for future diplomacy toward North Korea or as another lesson learned on a three-decade long road strewn with North Korea policy failures.
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The one-page Singapore Declaration signed by former U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is admittedly a thin reed upon which to build. It identifies four aspirational objectives: 1) a new U.S.-North Korean relationship, 2) peace on the Korean Peninsula, 3) work toward ¡°complete denuclearization,¡± and 4) a return of the remains of American MIAs from the Korean War from North Korea. At the time of the declaration¡¯s signing, North Korea specialist Andrei Lankov assessed that ¡°we expected it to be a flop, but it¡¯s floppier than anything we expected. The declaration is pretty much meaningless.¡± But the inevitable temptation among the Biden team to toss a document signed by Trump may be tempered by the other signature on the document: that of Kim Jong-un.
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Some might argue that Kim Jong-un himself was never sincere about the declaration, while others will blame the failure to implement the declaration on miscommunications at the February 2019 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi. Trump administration Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun spent over two years declaring that the door was open to working-level negotiations to flesh out a denuclearization-for-peace and normalization pathway for the U.S.-North Korea relationship. Despite his efforts, Biegun earned only a week of face time with North Korean diplomats in Pyongyang in preparation for the Hanoi summit and a day in Stockholm in October following the summit¡¯s failure.
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Moreover, North Korea¡¯s own internal assessment of the U.S.-North Korea relationship provided at the Eighth Korean Worker¡¯s Party Congress last month further reveals North Korea¡¯s true intent. At the meeting, Kim credited the adoption of the Singapore Declaration ¡°that assured the establishment of new DPRK-US relations,¡± but failed to mention commitments to establishing peace or denuclearization. Moreover, the Congress assessment reveals that summitry proved politically useful to Kim as a venue for North Korea to defend ¡°its independent interests and peace and justice against the superpower.¡± Kim asserted that his meeting with Trump raised North Korea¡¯s strategic position and prestige, but it did not serve as a pathway for real improvement of relations with the United States, still characterized during the Congress as North Korea¡¯s ¡°principal enemy.¡±
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This image made from a broadcast by North Korea¡¯s KRT shows a military parade with what appears to be a new intercontinental ballistic missile at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on October 10, 2020. KRT VIA AP
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Although Kim Jong-un appears to have walked away from the Singapore Declaration, the Biden administration should leave the door open for North Korea to take part in substantive working-level negotiations. Simply maintaining a posture of openness to and readiness for a denuclearization dialogue contradicts propaganda efforts designed to lay the blame for North Korea¡¯s failures on a perceived U.S. ¡°hostile policy.¡± The declaration also remains an accomplishment for Kim that provides an already existing framework for moving forward if North Korea chooses to do so.
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Most important, a reaffirmation of the validity of the Singapore Declaration provides an opportunity to challenge Kim to reaffirm the declaration himself and to preserve the self-restraint shown on mid- and long-range missile testing that made both the declaration and the three summits with a U.S. president possible. Just as North Korean self-restraint is an essential condition for the Biden administration to keep the declaration in place, a North Korean return to missile testing would catalyze a U.S. campaign to rebuild international support for implementation of an expanded UN sanctions regime that has eroded since Kim turned to summitry in 2018.
°¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ Á¡Àº ½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£ ¼±¾ðÀÇ Å¸´ç¼ºÀ» ÀçÈ®ÀÎÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ±èÁ¤Àº ÃѺñ¼·Î ÇÏ¿©±Ý Á÷Á¢ ½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£ ¼±¾ðÀ» ÀçÈ®ÀÎÇÏ°í, ½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£ ¼±¾ð°ú ¹Ì±¹ ´ëÅë·É°úÀÇ ¼¼ ¹øÀÇ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀ» °¡´ÉÇÏ°Ô ÇÑ ÁßÀå°Å¸® ¹Ì»çÀÏ ½ÇÇè¹ß»ç¿¡¼ º¸¿©ÁØ ÀÚÁ¦·ÂÀ» À¯ÁöÇÏ°Ô ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ±âȸ¸¦ Á¦°øÇÑ´Ù´Â Á¡ÀÌ´Ù. ¹ÙÀ̵ç ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ ÀÌ ¼±¾ðÀ» ÁöÅ°´Â µ¥ ÀÖ¾î ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÀÚÁ¦·ÂÀÌ ²À ÇÊ¿äÇÑ Á¶°ÇÀÎ °Í°ú ¸¶Âù°¡Áö·Î, ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¹Ì»çÀÏ ½ÇÇè¹ß»ç·Î º¹±ÍÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀº ±èÁ¤Àº ÃѺñ¼°¡ 2018³â Á¤»óȸ´ã¿¡ Âü¿©ÇÑ ÀÌÈÄ ¼ö±×·¯µç À¯¿£ Á¦Àç È®´ë ÀÌÇàÀ» À§ÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ±¹Á¦Àû ÁöÁö¸¦ À籸ÃàÇÏ·Á´Â Ä·ÆäÀÎÀÇ Ã˸ÅÁ¦°¡ µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Finally, an affirmation of the Singapore Declaration provides a foundation for alliance cohesion with Japan and South Korea by acknowledging South Korea¡¯s desire to keep open a pathway for improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations while perpetuating a framework that might help keep in place North Korean self-restraint on missile testing that most immediately endangers Japan.
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Building on the Singapore Declaration uses Kim¡¯s own commitments, limited as they are, to provide a foundation on which to build allied support for a peace-and-denuclearization pathway that can ease North Korea¡¯s isolation and enhance its security and prosperity. Keeping the spotlight on Kim will help clarify Kim¡¯s motives, highlighting the costs and sparse returns on his investments-to-date in nuclear and military development.
½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£ ¼±¾ðÀ» Åä´ë·Î ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ºñ·Ï Á¦ÇÑÀûÀ̱ä Çصµ ±èÁ¤Àº ÃѺñ¼ ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ¾à¼ÓÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿©, ºÏÇÑÀÇ °í¸³À» ¿ÏÈÇÏ°í ¾Èº¸¿Í ¹ø¿µÀ» °ÈÇÒ ¼öÀÖ´Â ÆòÈ¿Í ºñÇÙÈ °æ·Î¿¡ ´ëÇÑ µ¿¸Í Áö¿øÀ» ±¸ÃàÇÏ´Â ±â¹ÝÀ» Á¦°øÇÑ´Ù. Áö¼ÓÀûÀ¸·Î ±èÁ¤Àº ÃѺñ¼¿¡ ÁýÁßÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ÇÙ°ú ±º»ç·Â ¹ßÀü¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌÁ¦±îÁöÀÇ ÅõÀÚ¿¡ ÀÖ¾î ±× ºñ¿ë°ú ±×¿¡ ¹ÝÇØ ºó¾àÇÑ ¼öÀÍÀ» °Á¶Çß´ø ±èÁ¤Àº ÃѺñ¼ÀÇ µ¿±â¸¦ ¸íÈ®È÷ ÆľÇÇÏ´Â µ¥ µµ¿òÀÌ µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Scott Snyder is Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers.